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Letter from the Editors
We are proud to present this year’s twenty-first edition of
The Gettysburg Historical Journal. Having spent the last two years
working with each other and our authors over zoom, the chance to
meet in person with student editors and faculty advisors has given
us an experience that the current editorial board has not had in the
past. Despite the difficulties we continue to face since the
beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic—mental exhaustion,
uncertainty towards the future—we have been lucky enough to
receive submissions from many Gettysburg College students, as
well as a substantial number from undergraduate students outside
of our area. Through the works we have accepted this year, we
gain knowledge of history through difference perspectives and
learn how these narratives reveal new information about our past.
With the assistance of The Cupola, Gettysburg College’s
online research repository, and the distinguished college faculty,
our authors’ work has received both serious scholarly and national
attention. Past authors have published follow-up work in refereed
journals and presented their work at undergraduate and
professional conferences. The Gettysburg Historical Journal is a
student-run organization, providing undergraduate students with an
opportunity to gain valuable experience in reviewing, editing, and
organizing academic articles for publication. In all cases, authors
4

and editors have also had the opportunity to apply these skills to
their future careers, or their work as graduate students.
The following works we have selected for this year’s
edition of The Gettysburg Historical Journal demonstrate the
varied interests and abilities of undergraduate historians, as well as
their dedication to examining history from different perspectives:
Ziv Carmi’s essay, “Monuments of Legitimacy 17th
Century Tokugawa-Sponsored Architecture as Political Objects,”
aims to synthesize art history, historical memory, and Tokugawaera Japanese politics with an art-history approach and cultural
analysis, taking a more complete look at the politics of Tokugawa
Ieyasu’s death and the significance of memorial and religious
architecture as political works. It examines the utilization of
architecture as a way to elevate and legitimize the Tokugawa,
demonstrating that policy was not the only way for the Tokugawa
to solidify their legacy and suggesting that key figures like Ieyasu
were more important to the religious and political structures of
Tokugawa Japan in death than they were in life.
Reese Hollister’s essay, “Lenses, Focus, and Fluidity:
Lessons from Medieval Queer History,” looks to examine the field
of Queer and Transgender studies from an overlooked period in its
history, given a recent shift in focus that has revealed new
discoveries and interpretations. This historiographical analysis
5

posits that in the Middle Ages, gender and sexuality were much
more fluid than previously believed.
Gavin Maziarz’s essay, “The Spartacus Rebellion: More
Than a Slave Revolt,” is a short exploration of the Spartacus
Revolt as a multi-faceted revolt based off primary documents from
the period of and following the revolt.
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Featured Pieces
This year’s featured piece was written by William D.
Bowman, a professor in the History and International & Global
Studies Departments. Prof. Bowman’s research focuses on modern
European history, with an interest in German/Austrian history and
cultural in particular.

Ukraine is Suffering
William D. Bowman, Professor of History, Gettysburg College
Ukraine is suffering. In late February 2022, Vladimir Putin
ordered a Russian invasion of Ukraine. In an assault reminiscent
of fighting during the Second World War, Russian soldiers have
campaigned against Ukrainian forces and attacked civilians in
much of the country. After several weeks of waging war, Ukraine
has not fallen, as many military experts would have predicted. In
fact, in recent weeks Russian forces, having failed to take Kyiv,
Ukraine’s capital, have relocated themselves to the eastern region
of the country in an effort to take provinces bordering Russia
proper. This is the Donbas area of Ukraine, which is close to the
Crimea, which Putin’s troops took by force in 2014. The outcome
of the war on Ukraine is far from clear and the suffering
continues. Millions of Ukrainians have become refugees and fled
to neighboring Poland, Moldova, and other countries. Millions
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more are displaced persons in their home country. Ukrainian
resistance to Russian aggression has been fierce and the conflict
has no obvious outcome in site.
Ukraine suffered. During the Second World War, the
eastern front, which included Ukraine, was the site of some of the
most difficult military campaigning in the whole of Europe. The
country was part of what Timothy Snyder, one of the world’s
leading historians of the region, has called the “bloodlands.” After
mid-1941 and the launching of “Barbarossa,” the German code
name for the invasion of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was overrun
and occupied by enemy forces. In addition to military casualties,
the country sustained numerous civilian casualties as
well. Ukraine’s Jews and Communist party officials, in particular,
were targets of German military forces and the notorious
Einsatzgruppen, or special commando units, whose primary
purpose was the execution of Germany’s political and ethnic
“enemies.” Shootings in the open, in forests near towns or
villages, and over open mass graves, became the norm. Ukraine,
alongside Poland, the Baltic littoral (modern-day Estonia,
Lithuania, and Latvia), Belarus, and western Russia under German
occupation, suffered horrifically. Whole, historic communities of
Ukrainian Jews, in particular, were particularly hard hit under
barbaric conditions.
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Ukraine suffered even earlier in the twentieth-century. As
a consequence of Josef Stalin’s first “Five-Year Plan” and its
emphasis upon collectivization of farmland, Ukraine, then part of
the Soviet Union, fell victim to a massive famine. Traditionally
part of the breadbasket of imperial Russia and then the Soviet
Union, Ukraine found that its transformed agricultural landscape
could not keep pace with the grain demands of Stalin’s economic
plan. Shortages of grain in the countryside, however, met with
Soviet indifference. For Stalin, any grain produced in Ukraine had
to be used for his agricultural transformation of the Soviet Union
and not for the local population. As a consequence, three to four
million Ukrainians were intentionally allowed to starve to death, in
what came to be known as the Holodomor, a term that captures
both the hunger that haunted the land and the Soviet policy of
extermination that accompanied it.
As Putin ordered the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, he also
performed a brazen act of historical erasure. In what can only be
called an inversion of the past, he argued that Ukraine had no
independent existence outside of the Soviet Union, that it was a
product of the Bolshevik Revolution and its consolidation in the
period after 1917. This is part of his larger argument, articulated in
2005, that the great “tragedy” of the twentieth century was the
implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its loss of territories
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throughout eastern Europe, the Caucasus region, and in Central
Asia. In other words, what most of the world viewed as the end of
the Cold War and the liberation of numerous former Soviet
Socialist Republics, including Ukraine, was according to Putin and
this highly nationalistic version of Russian history a historic
tragedy. Moreover, the defunct Soviet Union and the Russian state
that emerged in its wake had also lost control and influence over a
whole swath of eastern European countries, such as East Germany
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania in
1989. It is this sense of territorial and political loss that fuels
Putin’s historical grievance and vision. Of course, his historical
statements are meant more as political justifications for his
aggressive foreign policy moves than as serious arguments about
the past. They are usually directed at the Russian public and not
Ukraine, Europe, or the west as a whole.
Any serious assessment of Ukraine’s past and its
relationship to a developing and emerging “Russia” would have to
give historical primacy in many respects to the former. After all,
Kievan Rus is usually considered the start of much of what one
would consider “Russian” history. It was there in the tenth century
that Orthodox Christianity was adopted as the state and majority
religion. In fact, even the messianic historical vision that Putin has
adopted originated in Kiev, which saw itself as the successor and
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defender of Orthodox Christianity and European civilization that
had arisen and been established in Constantinople, the original
heart of Byzantium. Historical claims and counter-claims about
political and cultural precedence are indeed very old in Europe and
in world history, too. They can be healthy signs of noteworthy and
defensible developments. Unfortunately, they are also all too often
used as popular justification for current aggressive and unjustified
political and military moves, as is the case in 2022.
The question now is how much more will Ukraine suffer in
the near future. As the brutal fighting continues, much of Europe
(and the United States) is sympathetic to the Ukrainian
cause. Indeed, the European Union and its member states have
thus far shown much resolve in supporting Ukraine. Noncombatant states, however, also lose that resolve over
time. Refugees pouring into Poland or Moldova place financial
burdens on those societies and beyond. Russia has recently cut
fuel exports to Poland and Bulgaria. As the conflict slogs on into
the summer of 2022, civilian casualties rise in Ukraine, and the
economic toil of the fighting mounts, pressure will be placed on
Ukraine to “settle” the war with Russia, even though the latter
invaded the former. As with the current military conflict itself,
discussion will likely focus on eastern Ukraine and provinces that
Putin desires that border Russia proper, connect lines of
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communication in the region, and link up with the Crimea. Even if
Ukraine can withstand the Russian military onslaught, it might
unfortunately still lose some of its territory in the east as part of a
political settlement of the war.
There are, however, two other radically different outcomes
to the war in Ukraine. First, despite all of their military difficulties
of the first several weeks of the campaigning, Russian forces could
gain the upper hand and use a consolidated base in the east to relaunch their attacks on Kiev and the rest of Ukraine. The country
could still fall. In which case, Putin would feel emboldened in his
historical vision and might look to Moldova or the Baltic littoral as
future territories that should, in his grandiose scheme, be
“restored” to Russia. In his estimation, what “history” do they
have beyond a Russian past?
On the other hand, Ukraine could “win” the war against
Russia. That might mean a stalemate in the east that forces Russia
to make very minor or no territorial demands. That might mean
continuing to show the weakness of the Russian military, its
leadership, its technology, and its morale and more or less
defeating it in the field. It might even mean that Putin overextends
himself and misplays the situation such that his internal, Russian
opponents move against him. All of these scenarios are unlikely,
to be sure, especially as Putin still holds nuclear weapons options
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and has shown his willingness to deal harshly with political
opponents. Nevertheless, the situation in Ukraine in late April and
early May of 2022 is far from clear and several outcomes to the
current fighting are possible. Above all else, one hopes that the
suffering in Ukraine stops and that an independent, sovereign, and
free country will survive to heal.
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